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With multi-year funding from the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), a team
of researchers has just released a comprehensive report detailing ethical issues
arising from human enhancement (Allhoff et al. 2009). While we direct the
interested reader to that (much longer) report, we also thank the editors of this
journal for the invitation to provide an executive summary thereof. This summary
highlights key results from each section of that report and does so in a self-standing
way; in other words, this summary presupposes no familiarity with the report and
offers the opportunity to gain quick familiarity with its most central ﬁndings.

What Is Enhancement?
‘‘Man is the only creature that refuses to be what he is’’ (Camus 1951, p. 11). Homo
sapiens has been such a proliﬁc species, simply because we are relentlessly
proﬁcient at adapting to our environment. At the most basic level, we have won
control over ﬁre and tools to forge a new world around us: we build shelter and
weave clothes to repel the brutal elements, and we raise animals and crops for

predictability in our meals. With intellect and resourcefulness, we are better able to
survive this world.
However, it is not just the world around us that we desire to change. Since the
beginning of history, we also have wanted to become more than human, to become
Homo superior. From the godlike command of Gilgamesh, to the lofty ambitions of
Icarus, to the preternatural strength of Beowulf, to the mythical skills of Shaolin
monks, and to various shamans and shapeshifters throughout the world’s cultural
history, we have dreamt—and still dream—of transforming ourselves to overcome
our all-too-human frailties and limitations.
In practice, this means that we improve our minds through education, disciplined
thinking, and meditation. We improve our bodies with a sound diet and physical
exercise, and we train with weapons and techniques to defend ourselves from those
who would conspire to kill. But today, something seems to be different. With
ongoing work to unravel the mysteries of our minds and bodies, coupled with the art
and science of emerging technologies, we are near the beginning of the Human
Enhancement Revolution.
Now we are no longer limited to ‘‘natural’’ methods to enhance ourselves or to
merely wield tools such as a hammer or binoculars or a calculator. We are beginning
to incorporate technology within our very bodies, which may hold moral
signiﬁcance that we need to consider. These technologies promise great beneﬁts
for humanity—such as increased productivity and creativity, longer lives, greater
serenity, stronger bodies and minds, and more—though there is a question of
whether these things translate into happier lives, which many see as the point of it
all (President’s Council on Bioethics 2003; Persaud 2006).
As examples of emerging technologies in the last year or so, several imaginative
inventions in particular are closing the gap even more between science ﬁction and
the real world. Scientists have conceptualized an electronic-packed contact lens that
may provide the wearer with telescopic and night vision or act as an omnipresent
digital monitor to receive and relay information (Parviz et al. 2008). Another
innovation is a touch display designed to be implanted just under the skin that would
activate special tattoo ink on one’s arm to form images, such as telephone-number
keys to punch or even a video to watch (Mielke 2008). Together with ever-shrinking
computing devices, we appear to be moving closer to cybernetic organisms (or
‘‘cyborgs’’); that is, where machines are integrated within our bodies or at least into
our clothing in the nearer-term. Forget about Pocket PCs, mobile phones, GPS
devices, and other portable gadgets; we might soon be able to communicate and
access those capabilities without having to carry any external device, thus raising
our productivity, efﬁciency, response time, and other desirable measures—in short,
enabling us to even better survive our world.
Technology is clearly a game-changing ﬁeld. The invention of such things as the
printing press, gunpowder, automobiles, computers, vaccines, and so on, has
profoundly changed the world, for the better we hope. But at the same time, they
have also led to unforeseen consequences, or perhaps consequences that might have
been foreseen and addressed had we bothered to investigate them. Least of all, they
have disrupted the status quo, which is not necessarily a terrible thing in and of
itself; but unnecessary and dramatic disruptions, such as mass displacements of

workers or industries, have real human costs. As we will discuss, this may well be
the case with human enhancement technologies, enabled by advances in nanotechnology, micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS), genetic engineering, robotics,
cognitive science, information technology, pharmacology, and other ﬁelds (Roco
and Bainbridge 2003).1
The NSF report is an examination of many social and ethical issues surrounding
human enhancement technologies. For example, concerning the issue of whether
such technologies ought to be regulated or otherwise restricted, one position is that
(more than minimal) regulation would hinder personal freedom or autonomy,
infringing on some natural or political right to improve our own bodies, minds, and
lives as we see ﬁt (Naam 2005; Bailey 2005; Harris 2007; Allhoff et al. 2010).
Others, however, advocate strong regulation—and even a research moratorium—to
protect against unintended effects on society, such as the presumably-undesirable
creation of a new class of enhanced persons who could outwit, outplay, and outlast
‘‘normal’’ or unenhanced persons for jobs, in schools, at sporting contests, and so on
(Fukuyama 2002, 2006; Friends of the Earth 2006). Still others seek a sensible
middle path between stringent regulation and individual liberty (Hughes 2004;
Greely 2005).
No matter where one is aligned on this issue, the human enhancement debate is a
deeply passionate and personal one, striking at the heart of what it means to be
human. Some see it as a way to fulﬁll or even transcend our potential; others see it
as a darker path towards becoming Frankenstein’s monster. To help untangle this
debate, the NSF report is comprised of a list of questions and answers, starting with
background issues and moving to speciﬁc concerns, including: freedom &
autonomy, health & safety, fairness & equity, societal disruption, and human
dignity. The report does not represent an exhaustive discussion of these issues;
indeed, many of these questions would require a book-length treatise for any
satisfying answer. Rather, the report is intended as a broad survey of the human
enhancement landscape and its main contours, not its more intricate rabbit holes and
subtler terrain, as other and future investigations will surely explore.

Deﬁnitions and Distinctions
Strictly speaking, ‘‘human enhancement’’ includes any activity by which we
improve our bodies, minds, or abilities—things we do to enhance our well-being
(Lin and Allhoff 2008). But it is tempting to think that ‘‘human enhancement’’ is
about boosting our capabilities beyond the species-typical level or statisticallynormal range of functioning for an individual (Daniels 2000). Consider the
following illustrative examples. As it concerns the mind, taking Ritalin to treat
attention-deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is aimed at correcting the deﬁcit;
but taken by otherwise-normal students to enable them to focus better in studying
1
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for exams is a form of human enhancement. And where reading a book may indeed
make you more knowledgeable, it does not make you so much smarter than most
everyone else or push your intellect past natural limits; on the other hand, a
computer chip implanted into your brain that gives you direct access to Google or
spreadsheets would provide mental capabilities beyond the species-typical level.
Since, strictly speaking, human enhancements seem to include such activities as
reading a book and eating vegetables it might appear that these ‘‘natural’’
enhancements are ethically unproblematic. It would be tempting to draw a line here
in the human enhancement debate such that ‘‘artiﬁcial’’ or ‘‘unnatural’’ enhancements require moral evaluation. However, this approach is problematic. First, there
appears to be vagueness as to what should count as ‘‘natural.’’ In addition, the
distinction between natural and artiﬁcial might objectionably rest on dubious
theological or teleological premises (e.g., that we have God-given goals or limits in
life such that living to 300 would be profanely unnatural or in violation of God’s
will).
One might be tempted by the thought that the internal-external distinction is
morally signiﬁcant insofar as one might think that human enhancements that are
internal are morally questionable, whereas those that are external are not. In other
words, the use of tools is perfectly moral, but incorporating tools as part of our
bodies is morally questionable. However, it could also be maintained that a neural
implant that gives access to Google and the rest of the online world does not seem to
be different in kind to using a laptop computer or Pocket PC to access the same. So
why should it matter that we are imbedding computing power into our heads rather
than carrying the same capabilities with us by way of external devices?

Context and the Moral Status of Enhancement
What counts as an enhancement and whether it is morally relevant seems to be
context-dependent. For example, we can imagine a society in which strict equality is
the over-arching value, trumping individual rights to life, liberty, knowledge, and so
on; thus immunizing a person from a serious disease might be prohibited in such a
world so to not upset egalitarian values or disrupt social institutions that strongly
rely on a certain range of life expectancy, e.g., a social security system. Another
example: freely burning fossil fuels was less morally signiﬁcant in 1910 than it is in
2010, given the current state of global warming, pollution, and their causes and
effects. Therefore, context matters, and so it seems premature to say that all
enhancements are morally worrisome, irrespective of context; but it is also
premature to declare all of them to be unproblematic, especially at a start of debate
exactly about those questions.
In this regard, we might also make an argument that strict equality is not morally
required in the ﬁrst place, given the natural and manageable range of variations in
our species; but if some future vaccine takes us well beyond this ‘‘normal’’ range,
e.g., super-longevity or super-strength, our social systems (including law and public
policy) are not equipped to account for those extra abilities, thereby raising latent
issues of equity, fairness, access, etc. Similarly, we can imagine a world in which

cognitive enhancements no longer hold much controversy as they do today, after
social structures in the future have adapted to account for them—just like, e.g.,
steroid use in sports might no longer be an ethical issue (perhaps only a health issue)
if we create separate competitions for the enhanced as well as unenhanced. Again,
context seems to matter.

Freedom and Autonomy
There is perhaps no greater value, at least in democracies, than the cherished
concept of freedom, loosely deﬁned here as the absence of constraints. But because
freedom is central to the issue of human enhancement, it adds much fuel to the
impassioned debate. Pro-enhancement advocates have argued against regulating
enhancements on the grounds that it would infringe on our fundamental ability to
choose how we want to live our own lives (Naam 2005; Bailey 2005; Harris 2007).
Or, in other words, if enhancing our bodies does not hurt anyone (other than
possibly ourselves), then why should we be prevented from doing so? This is a
common objection—arguing especially against governmental intervention—to any
number of proposals that involve regulation, from hiring practices to home
improvements to school clothing, and so on.
Though freedom may be viewed in democracies as a ‘‘sacred cow’’ that ought not
be corralled, the reality is that we do not have complete freedom in the areas of life
that we think we do anyway. As examples, freedom of the press and freedom of
speech do not protect the individual from charges of libel, slander, or inciting panic
by yelling ‘‘Fire!’’ in a crowded theater; our privacy expectations quietly give way
to security measures, such as searches on our property and persons at airports or
eavesdropping on our communications; and even ancestral homes built by the hands
of one’s forefathers could be unilaterally seized (and demolished) by the state under
eminent domain laws. This is to say that whatever rights we have also imply
responsibilities and exist within some particular political system. Therefore, it is not
unreasonable to expect or deﬁne certain limits for those rights, especially where
they conﬂict with other rights and obligations.
Maximal freedom is a hallmark of a laissez-faire or minimal state, but a
democratic society is not compelled to endorse such a stance, as some political
philosophers have suggested (e.g., Nozick 1974). Nor would reasonable people
necessarily want unrestricted freedom anyway, e.g., no restrictions or background
checks for gun ownership. Even the most liberal democracy today understands the
value of regulations as a way to enhance our freedom. For instance, our economic
system is not truly a ‘‘free market’’: though we may advocate freedom in general,
regulations exist not only to protect our rights, but also to create an orderly process
that greases the economic wheel, accelerating both innovations and transactions. As
a simpler example, by imposing laws on trafﬁc, we can actually increase our
freedom: by driving forward on only one side of the road, we can be (more) assured
that we will not be a victim of a head-on collision, which makes driving faster a
more sensible proposition.

There is another sense, related to free will, in which cognitive enhancements may
be infringing: if an enhancement, such as a mood-altering drug or neural implant,
interferes with or alters our deliberative process, then it is an open question whether
or not we are truly acting freely while under the inﬂuence of the enhancement. For
instance, a ‘‘citizen chip’’ embedded in the brain might cause us to be unswervingly
patriotic and hold different values than we would otherwise. Further, external
pressure from peers, employers, competitors, national security, and others to accept
a particular enhancement also may unduly inﬂuence one’s decision making (Guston
et al. 2007). Such considerations have some obvious moral implications.

Fairness and Equity
It is certainly understandable that one might desire or even feel pressure to enhance
one’s self or children, but it is important to note the following: advantages gained by
enhanced persons also imply a relative disadvantage for the unenhanced, whether in
sports, employment opportunities, academic performance, or any other area. That is
to say, fairness is another value to consider in the debate. A related worry is that the
wealthy would be the ﬁrst adopters of human enhancement technologies, given that
they can best afford such innovations (like LASIK eye surgery), thus creating an
even wider gap between the haves and the have-nots (McKibben 2004).
In considering the issue of fairness, we need to be careful not to conﬂate it with
equity. Under most economic theories, fairness does not require that we need to
close the gap entirely between economic classes, even when justice is deﬁned as
fairness (Rawls 1971; for an application of Rawls to enhancement, see Allhoff
2005). Indeed, there are good reasons to think that we want some gap to exist, for
example, to provide incentives for innovations, in order to move up the economic
ladder, and to allow ﬂexibility in a workforce to ﬁll vacancies and perform a wide
range of tasks. At least some competition seems to be desirable, especially when
resources to be allocated are limited.
Thus, inequality itself is not so much the point, though any poverty or decline in
welfare related to increased inequality may be a serious concern. We do not want
people to stop striving to improve their own lives, even if the situation for others is
not improved at the same time or ever. And natural advantages and inequities
already exist without moral issues anyway; Hobbes recognized that these organic
differences did not give any individual or group of individuals so much net
advantage that they would be invulnerable to the ‘‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short’’ conditions that mark human life (Hobbes 1651, p. I.xiii.9).
If human enhancement technologies develop as predicted, they can afford us a
tremendous advantage in life; e.g., over others in a competition for resources, so
much so that it overstretches the natural range of equality to the point where
inequality becomes a more salient issue. This is where the gap between enhanced
and unenhanced persons may be too wide to bridge, making the latter into dinosaurs
in a hypercompetitive world. If we assume that the beneﬁts of being an enhanced
person must be largely paid from the welfare of others, e.g., a job-gain by one
person is a job-loss by another. Since the others are now at a relative disadvantage,

this may further impoverish the unenhanced, which may limit their access to such
things as healthcare, legal representation, political inﬂuence, and so on.

Social Disruptions
Fairness and equality are not just theoretical values, but they have practical effects.
Gross inequality itself, whether fair or not, can motivate the worse-off masses to
revolt against a state or system. But societal disruption need not be so extreme to be
taken seriously. Entire institutions today—as well as the lack thereof—are based on
a speciﬁc range of abilities and rough equality of natural assets. Sports, for instance,
would change dramatically, if enhanced persons are permitted to compete to the
clear disadvantage of unenhanced athletes, smashing their previous records. (This is
not to say that sports should ban enhanced competitors, only that doing so would
have a real, signiﬁcant affect on careers and expend valuable resources to adjust
sporting programs and contests.)
Other institutions and systems include economic, privacy, communications,
pensions, security, and many other sectors of society. For instance, if life-extension
technologies can increase our average lifespan by 20 years—let alone the
100 ? years predicted by some futurists (Kurzweil 2005; de Grey 2007), and
assuming that the extra 20 years will be a good life, not one bogged down with
illness and diminishing productivity that afﬂict many elderly today—then we would
need to radically adjust retirement programs: do we move the retirement age to 85,
which has negative consequences for job-seekers such as new tenure-track academic
faculty, or increase contributions to pension plans, which puts pressure on
household budgets and employers? Or both? Also, assuming birth rates do not
decline (which causes problems of its own), longer lives will mean more pressure on
resources such as energy and food.
Some scenarios that may cause social disruption include: a job candidate with a
neural implant that enables better data retention and faster information processing
would consistently beat out unenhanced candidates; a person with super-human
hearing or sight could circumvent existing privacy protections and expectations by
easily and undetectably eavesdropping or spying on others; more students (and
professors) using Ritalin may grab admission or tenure at all the best universities,
and so on.

Human Dignity and the Good Life
The ﬁercest resistance to human enhancement technologies is perhaps a concern
about their effect on ‘‘human dignity’’ and what it means to be human (President’s
Council on Bioethics 2003; Sandel 2007). For instance, does the desire for
enhancement show ingratitude for what we have and (further) enable an attitude of
unquenchable dissatisfaction with one’s life? Some researchers suggest that
discontent is hardwired into the genetic makeup of humans (Hill 2006; Woodall
2007), which is why we constantly innovate, strive to achieve and gain more, etc.

However, even if this is true, it does not seem to be so much an argument to promote
human enhancement technologies, but more a worry that those technologies are not
the panacea or Holy Grail of happiness we might believe them to be. That is, we will
still be dissatisﬁed with ourselves no matter how much we enhance ourselves (unless,
of course, we somehow eradicate that part of our DNA that causes discontent).
Would human enhancement technologies hinder moral development? Many
believe that ‘‘soul-making’’ is impossible without struggle (Hick 1966), and
achievements ring hollow without sacriﬁce or effort (President’s Council on
Bioethics 2003); so if technology makes life and competitions easier, then we may
lose opportunities to feed and grow our moral character. On the other hand, compare
our lives today with pre-Internet days: increased connectivity to friends, work,
information, etc. is often a double-edged proposition that also increases stress and
decreases free time. This, then, raises the related concern of whether enhancement
technologies will actually make our lives happier. (If the research mentioned above
about discontent in our genes is accurate, then we might have a psychobiological
reason to think not.)
Is the frailty of the human condition necessary to best appreciate life? There is
something romantic about the notion of being mortal and fallible. But with existing
pharmacology, we could eliminate the emotion of sadness today, and work is
continuing on drugs that repress memories; but it is not clear that sadness (at least in
the normal range, as opposed to clinical depression) is a ‘‘pathology’’ we should want
to eliminate, rather than a human experience that we should preserve (President’s
Council on Bioethics 2003). Other critics have suggested that life could be too long,
leading to boredom after one’s life-goals are achieved (e.g., Williams 1973).
Finally, there might be concern that we are playing God with world-changing
technologies, which is presumably bad (Peters 2007). But what exactly counts as
‘‘playing God’’, and why is that morally wrong; i.e., where exactly is the
proscription in religious scripture? If we deﬁne the concept as manipulating nature,
then we all have been guilty of that since the ﬁrst man picked up a stick. Making
life-and-death decisions is a plausible candidate as a deﬁnition, but then physicians
as well as soldiers (even in holy wars?) could be accused of this charge.

Rights and Obligations
Rights can be divided into two broad classes: a class of human rights, sometimes
called ‘‘natural rights’’, and a class of more conventional rights based on the speciﬁc
customs, roles, and laws of a society. Examples of the former are famously listed in
the American Declaration of Independence: ‘‘We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.’’
The right to enhancement is not speciﬁcally included in this list or in other familiar
lists of human rights. But it could be argued that a right of enhancement is a right
derived from some or all of the human rights like those listed in the Declaration of
Independence. Humans should be able to exercise their right to enhancements to the
extent that it promotes their life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness.

However, this at most would make a right to enhancement a prima facie right
because human rights themselves, though fundamental, can conﬂict and are
susceptible to modiﬁcation and qualiﬁcation. One’s right to liberty, for example,
does not automatically permit infringement on the rights of others. Rights frequently
trump one another in our considerations about which action is correct. But rights can
also be trumped by extremely harmful consequences. Therefore, even if the right to
enhancement is regarded as a derived human right, its application in a particular
situation could be challenged on the grounds that it infringes on the rights of others
or that its exercise would lead to extreme harm.
The right to enhancement can also be regarded as conventional. ‘‘Conventional’’
does not mean ‘‘arbitrary’’ but ‘‘established by general agreement or practice.’’ We
can make laws, for example, that allow some enhancements and laws that prohibit
others. How justiﬁed such conventional rights or prohibitions are depends upon how
good the reasons are for them. We might easily justify the use of nanodevices that
patrol our bodies for cancerous outbreaks. We would prohibit the use of
nanodevices that would give humans a burst of intelligence followed by likely
seizures and strokes.

Policy and Law
Given the preceding discussion, it should be clear that human enhancement is more
than just about the individual’s freedom or autonomy, but there are plausibly
negative consequences to others and society that need to be considered. Or at least
an argument needs to be made that freedom/autonomy trumps all other values, but
such a position seems unacceptably dogmatic. These issues point to the policy
dilemma of whether we should regulate or restrict on human enhancement
technologies, so as to prevent or mitigate some of the negative impacts. Three
answers suggest themselves: (1) no restrictions, (2) some restrictions, or (3) a
moratorium or full ban.
A moratorium seems unrealistic to the extent that a worldwide one would be
needed to truly stem the use of human enhancement technologies, and that no
worldwide moratorium on anything has yet to work, including on (alleged) attempts
to clone a human being. A local moratorium would send patients to ‘‘back-alley’’
enhancement clinics or to more liberal regions of the world, as is the case with
‘‘cosmetic-surgery vacations’’ in which those medical procedures are less expensive
in other nations. Further, a ban on enhancement research seems much too
premature—an overreaction to perceived, future risks—as well as a real threat to
therapy-related research today.
On the other side of the spectrum, the idea of having no restrictions on human
enhancement technologies seems to be reckless or at least unjustiﬁably optimistic,
given that there are plausible risks. As pointed out earlier, complete freedom or
autonomy may be a recipe for disaster and chaos in any case; we do not want to
grant the right to yell ‘‘Fire!’’ in a crowded venue or the right for dangerous felons
to own ﬁrearms.

So what about ﬁnding middle ground with some non-Draconian regulations?
Critics have argued that any regulation would be imperfect and likely ineffectual,
much like laws against contraband or prostitution (Naam 2005); but it is not clear
that eliminating these laws would improve the situation, all things considered. Also,
as a society, we still believe we ought to at least try to solve social ills, even if we
cannot ultimately ﬁx the entire problem, e.g., we cannot stop any given crime from
ever occurring, yet we still have laws against such acts. And even if there are
practical reasons to not pursue regulations, would that send the wrong message; e.g.,
to children, that we support enhancement without reservations?
The issue of regulation will surely not be settled here, nor do we intend it to be.
Yet it is important to keep in mind that the human enhancement debate is not just a
theoretical discussion about ethics, but has bearing on the real world with policy
decisions that may affect not just the would-be enhanced, but also researchers,
manufacturers, social institutions, as well as our ideals of freedom and human
dignity (Lin 2007).

Conclusion
This has been a short review of a number of major questions in the ethics debate on
human enhancement. An impressive array of technologies is driving the urgency of
this debate, from familiar drugs (e.g., steroids, modaﬁnil, Ritalin) to fantastic
visions of a cybernetic future. No one knows which visions—utopian, dystopian, or
pedestrian—ultimately will be realized. But insofar as there are good reasons to
think that many of these visions are plausible, it seems prudent to at least begin a
conversation about the many ethical, legal, social, and political issues associated
with human enhancement, especially since ethics seems to historically lag (far)
behind technology and other quickly-evolving events. By planning ahead, we can be
better prepared to enact legislation or regulation as deemed ﬁt.
The NSF report represents a disinterested, sensible middle path in presenting the
various sides of each issue, given the early stage of this debate, though clearly there
are passionate and opposing forces engaged in this international struggle for clarity
and policy. An increasing ﬂow of thoughtful literature exists (e.g., Savulescu and
Bostrom 2009), and we expect the arguments to continue for many more years—
proving the prediction that human enhancement ethics will be one of the most
important debates in science and society is this brave new century.
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